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Introduction 
Intelligent machines have reached capabilities that go beyond a level that a human being can 
fully comprehend without sufficiently detailed understanding of the underlying mechanisms. 
The choice of moves in the game Go (generated by Deep Mind’s Alpha Go Zero [1]) are an 
impressive example for an artificial intelligence system calculating results that even a human 
expert for the game can hardly retrace [2]. But this is, quite literally, a toy example. In reality, 
intelligent algorithms are encroaching more and more into our everyday lives, be it through 
algorithms that recommend products for us to buy, or whole systems such as driverless 
vehicles. We are delegating ever more aspects of our daily routines to machines, and this 
trend looks set to continue in the future. Indeed, continued economic growth is set to depend 
on it. The nature of human-computer interaction in the world that the digital transformation is 
creating will require (mutual) trust between humans and intelligent, or seemingly intelligent, 
machines. But what does it mean to trust an intelligent machine? How can trust be established 
between human societies and intelligent machines? 
 
The concept of trust plays an important role in many contexts [3]–[5]. In the social world trust 
is about the expectation of cooperative, supportive, and non-hostile behavior. In psychological 
terms, trust is the result of cognitive learning from experiences of trusting behavior with others. 
Philosophically, trust is the taking of risk on the basis of a moral relationship between 
individuals. In the context of economics and international relations, trust is based on calculated 
incentives for alternative behaviors, conceptualized through game theory. Game theory is also 
used in the field of multi-agent systems to model trust between artificial agents. In the case of 
management of organizations, trust is about exposing vulnerability, while assuming that the 
other individual will not take advantage of this. In the world of automation, trust is seen as a 
feature of entities that can be calculated as the probability of reliable behavior in the presence 
of externally induced uncertainty. In general, perhaps the common summary of the various 
views of trust is that it expresses a willingness to take risk under uncertainty [6]. 
Levels of Trust 
 
There is a long tradition of work looking at trust between humans, or between artificial agents 
(see, for example, [7]). But to what extent can these results be transferred to interactions 
between humans and intelligent machines? Before we can address this question, we need to 
distinguish between three levels of “trust”. We call these inductive trust, social trust, and moral 
trust. 
 
Inductive trust is derived from personal past experience: a person trusts something because 
it has previously acted in the way that they expected (e.g. they have used it themselves, they 
have seen somebody else using it, they have used something very similar, or they have been 
told by somebody trusted or read from a trusted source what behavior they should expect). 
This type of trust is the simplest to formalize, being based simply on an estimation of expected 
outcomes. When the concept of “trust” between humans and machines is discussed, it most 
commonly inductive trust that is being suggested.  
 
However, in many places the resulting “sense of trust” is misplaced, as humans have a 
tendency to over interpret the depth of their relationships with machines, and to think of them 
in social or moral terms where this is not warranted. This is especially likely to occur where 
the intelligence within the machine is opaque, as this tends to lead people to overestimate the 
level of intelligence within the machine. In contrast, over-skepticism by humans, i.e. the view 
that no machine can really be trusted, will prevent the intended use of the technology through 
unnecessary fear. For example, people tend to prefer human forecasters to algorithmic 
forecasters, even when they have seen the algorithm outperform a human forecaster [8]. In 
general, the challenge is to accurately model the risk and consequences of a machine failing 
to act as anticipated, in order to prevent the interaction between the human and the machine 
being based on a disproportionate attribution of trust, or indeed, the attribution of too little trust.  
 
The next level of trust between entities, social trust, attributes goal-directed behaviour to the 
machine in the encounter between humans and machines, such that the machine has its own 
goals that it is trying to achieve in a strategic way, in a similar manner as humans do in the 
context of their social interactions. Because the goals of two humans, or two machines, or a 
human and a machine may not be the same, the decision about whether to trust or not involves 
strategic reasoning by the truster. Given that the entity being trusted is likely to act in a way 
that furthers its own goals, how should I respond in order to achieve my goals? This can also 
be formalized using game theory, and has been extensively studied in the multi-agent systems 
[9], economics [10] and general trust management literature. However, this work has to date 
focused either on person-person or machine-machine interactions, as opposed to interactions 
between people and machines.  
 
The third level of trust is moral trust, where trust between the interactants is based on a shared 
sense of rights and obligations, rooted in a principled sense of what is right and wrong, that 
can override strategic concerns. In human-human interactions, this corresponds to a belief 
that the person being trusted is benevolent [11]. This trust is based on shared values, i.e. that 
the person will behave in a good way towards the one that trusts them, beyond the level of 
goodness implied by the possible benefits that are derived from doing what is expected – e.g. 
payment. This type of trust has been largely unexplored within AI and computer science, yet 
is clearly fundamental to human-human relationships. Therefore, we finish by asking how and 
to what extent this type of trust relationship can be replicated between groups of humans and 
machines.   
 
In the remainder of this paper we examine how trust can be established and maintained, and 
how this varies among the three types of trust. We argue that explainable AI plays a key role 
both in the initial establishment of trust, and in repairing trust relationships that have broken 
down. A crucial point about the establishment of trust is that a trust relationship between a 
person and a machine does not exist in isolation. Trust spreads through a network of peers, 
and is also delegated to higher levels such as firms and institutions. We consider how trust 
can be formalized and operationalized within an intelligent machine, and the extent to which 
existing work allows us to do this. We finish by considering the prospects for sharing values 
and morals between people and intelligent machines, allowing for true moral trust. 
 
 
 
Mechanisms for establishing and maintaining trust 
 
Why do we need explainable AI? 
Where a system is used routinely, e.g. taking an autonomously driving car to work every day, 
then explanations are unlikely to be requested by the user on a daily basis. In other words, 
once inductive trust is established, the daily decision of whether or not to trust the system 
becomes subconscious. But how can trust between a user and a new intelligent machine 
become established in the first place? If the machine is new, and has not been used by anyone 
before, then inductive trust cannot function as there are no past examples to go by. This is a 
crucial problem for early adopters of a technology -- why should they trust a new machine? 
Explainable AI holds the key here. If a machine can provide an explanation to the early adopter 
as to why it is acting in the way that it is, this can give the early adopter a reason to trust it in 
the absence of past experience. This is because an explanation of how the system will act 
reduces the risk that the user perceives in the interaction. Note that these types of explanations 
are ex ante -- knowing how something works in advance of using it can help you trust it. This 
is particularly the case with early adopters who are likely to be tech savvy and hence have 
some level of domain expertise.  
 
Explainable AI is also needed to repair inductive trust relationships that have broken down, by 
providing an explanation to the user as to why unexpected behavior occurred. An example of 
this in our everyday lives occurs when a satellite navigation system sends a driver along a 
different route than usual, which violates the driver’s inductive model of how the system should 
be behave. Without an explanation for the deviation, the user’s inductive trust in the system is 
likely to be undermined. This is because a small number of occurrences of unexpected 
behavior is likely to outweigh a much larger number of occurrences of expected behavior when 
the user is making their trust decision. But a human understandable explanation, e.g. that the 
normal route is blocked by an accident, allows the user to disregard this counterexample. The 
role of the explanation is therefore to realign the deviation with the user’s underlying model of 
behavior.  
What type of explanation do people need? 
 
There is no generally accepted technical formal definition of the terms explainability and 
interpretability, however a common understanding should suffice. An intelligent system is 
interpretable if it can produce information about why and how it reached a result in a form 
understandable by people. For example, for a deep learning algorithm used for image 
recognition, this may mean that the system can explain which part of the input picture 
contributed most to the result and which did not [12]. If the reasoning process can be made 
knowable and inspectable, the data rendered understandable, and the path from data to 
decision made intelligible, then a relationship of trust could be constructed. Given this, 
understanding a specific decision is akin to understanding the reasoning process, and the 
specific data that the process has operated upon. In order to aid people to understand 
decisions, without first becoming experts in specific machine learning techniques or whichever 
other formalism underpins the machine's decision-making intelligence, an intelligent machine 
should exploit trust-building exemplars from within the wider world. Explanation is one such 
exemplar. When people wish to understand the decisions of others then they request an 
explanation, an account of the reasoning that lead to the decision. Real world explanations 
are commonly verbal or textual, and occur in a wide range of circumstances. Such 
circumstances can range from domestic, interpersonal relationships, through public 
companies explaining poor trading performance, to the various parties to a legal case 
explaining their behavior with respect to the question at issue. 
 
Furthermore it is likely that trust between people and machines will be improved if the people 
concerned can understand the decisions that are made [13], and can interpret those decisions 
within a more familiar framework. Such an approach can contribute not only to the trust 
relationship but has positive implications for related notions of fairness, unbiasedness, privacy 
[14] trustworthiness, and understandability [15]. In the case of machine intelligence, an 
explanation would consist of an account of the process that was followed to get from the 
incoming data to the decision. This account may incorporate statements about the specific 
data that did or did not affect the outcome as well as statements that serve to link the data to 
the outcome, and perhaps statements that serve to limit the scope of the decision. Such an 
account might incorporate linguistic statements, turning the data into words and phrases, 
which would be in line with the majority of real-world human-human explanatory practices, but 
need not be limited to such. Whilst we generally expect a verbal or textual explanation for a 
given set of circumstances, an explanation can also comprise processes of highlighting, 
filtering, or otherwise constraining the available data solely to that which is pertinent. An 
explanation, however rendered, is also an opportunity to introduce ancillary information that 
perhaps sheds light on the context in which a decision is made. An additional benefit of 
linguistic explanations is the associated increase in intelligibility and interpretability of the 
system. Turning data into a concise natural language explanation can turn an otherwise 
opaque system into one that can be understood and predicted. 
 
An important question when designing the system is who exactly should the explanations be 
aimed at? Explanations should be given based on the person requesting the explanation. For 
example, an autonomously driven car may state to its passenger that it has a problem with its 
engine, while to a mechanic it may state the technical details of the problem. However, the 
onus is on us as developers to improve education of users about intelligent machines, so that 
users have the correct conceptual model of what an intelligent machine is in order to avoid 
them being misled by an explanation, i.e. thinking more is going on in the machine than there 
actually is. Finally, we note that sometimes domain expertise will be necessary to be able to 
derive any meaningful understanding from an explanation. A prime example would be 
intelligent machines working in the medical domain, where explanations are likely to need to 
be aimed at medical doctors rather than patients. In such cases the patient trusts the machine 
because of the trust they have in the doctor.  
 
However, even explanation aimed at domain experts may not always be possible. Intelligent 
machines are, for specific problems, beginning to exceed human capability. In many cases 
this is due to the increased ability of machines to work constantly, consistently, at scale, and 
at speed. In some areas, for example Deep Mind's Alpha Go Zero, the results appear to 
exceed human ability; some moves are made that are novel and inexplicable to human Go-
playing experts and yet are effective, leading to more wins and new insights into the game 
[16]. This raises the question of the limits of explainability. If a human expert cannot interpret 
the results, beyond saying that they are correct, then the onus is upon the machine to 
automatically generate an explanation that is intelligible and sheds light upon the process. 
This relies upon the assumption that there is nothing supra-human about the reasoning 
processes involved; i.e. that there are no basic processes occurring within the machine that is 
beyond human capability. Regardless, how to build an intelligent system that can generate 
novel, correct, but non-understandable results which are in turn explained and made 
understandable is a challenging open question. The construction of such a system might be 
considered to constitute a form of Turing test [17] for explainable machine intelligence. 
 
The problems of explanation and justification become acute when one considers stochastic AI 
methods. For example, an evolutionary algorithm may search through millions of possible 
solutions, using stochastic operators such as recombination and mutation to move between 
solutions. This stochasticity presents issues when trying to recreate decisions at a later date. 
There exist a number of approaches to making such methods more explainable; for example, 
saving additional meta-information during the algorithm’s execution may facilitate the 
construction of an explanation of the final solution. Alternatively, for population based 
approaches, an explanation that contrasts the chosen solution against other members of the 
final population may provide some form of justification for the final solution. A more radical 
approach would be to alter the algorithm itself, only using operators that make decisions which 
can subsequently be presented to the user in a manner that shows their contribution to the 
final solution.  
 
 
 
Networks and levels of Trust 
When we form a trust relation with a single entity, we not only trust actions and information 
performed by and received from this other entity, but also implicitly establish transitive trust 
relations with other entities. This serves as a shortcut for the creation of trust relationships. 
We no longer have to gain direct experience of interacting with an entity directly, in order to 
slowly build up our own inductive model of its expected behavior. Instead, our existing trust 
relationships can be exploited (Fig. 1). It is important to stress here that trust is contextual -- I 
may trust a mechanic recommended to me by a friend, but only if that friend has experience 
with cars. In other words, we may trust humans or machines in some contexts but not others, 
based on our judgment of their competence in that context.   
 
An example of this is when we trust an application because somebody we know (and trust) 
trusts the application as well. Therefore, we assume the application is trustworthy. The main 
idea, however, is that we did not generate trust in the application per se but trust a person that 
trusts the application. This effect is likely to be crucial when establishing trust in a new 
technology: we are likely to use a new technology because our friends also use it. Trust in 
new technologies therefore propagates from the early adopters that build their own inductive 
models from personal experience, out through wider social networks by exploiting the 
transitivity of trust. This serves as a shortcut to save us from having to assess the application 
ourselves.  
 
Trust networks do not just operate horizontally, in this peer-to-peer manner, but trust 
relationships can also be displaced vertically from a lower level (1st order trust) e.g. intelligent 
machines; to a higher level (2nd order trust) entity e.g. companies, or mechanisms such as 
rules governing interactions [18]. For instance, when an individual buys a car, it does not need 
to trust each worker that produces each part. Rather, it only needs to trust the firm. Similarly, 
a user trusts a website because of the sole presence of a small green padlock next to the URL 
which signals a secure and hence trustworthy site, i.e. the padlock acts as a trust trigger [19]. 
Likewise, a user of an e-commerce website can trust a seller based on its previous reviews 
because he trusts that the review system itself is not biased or manipulated. The fundamental 
benefit of such 2nd order trust is that it reduces the number of trust relationships by (i) 
aggregating numerous entities into one higher entity and by (ii) extending trust from a lifetime-
limited entity (humans, machines, etc.) to a virtually unlimited entity (companies, rules, etc.). 
Overall, this massively reduces the costs of creating, maintaining and monitoring trust 
relationships.  
 
Networks of trust, whether horizontal or vertical, are ubiquitous. Yet, they also present 
important challenges. For instance, a minor change in one trust relationship can affect the 
connected trust relationships and potentially create an avalanche with dramatic effects. If a 
user realizes that the review system of an e-commerce website is flawed, he might lose trust 
in any of the sellers on that website. Such challenges have been extensively studied in 
human-human relationships in economics, and in machine-machine relationships in multi-
agent systems. But the case of human-machine relationships in which agents do not 
necessarily share morals, norms and emotions are still poorly understood. Further work is 
needed to understand how networks of trust can be operationalized and adapted to human-
machine relationships. 
 
 
Operationalizing Trust 
Inductive trust can be operationalized through building statistical models of expected behavior, 
and explainable AI that establishes initial trust and repairs the trust relationship when it is 
threatened by unexpected behavior. But how can social and moral trust be operationalized? 
Operationalizing social trust through game theory 
We need to consider social trust whenever a machine has its own goals that it is acting to 
fulfill. Because these goals may not necessarily coincide with our own, this involves strategic 
reasoning to determine whether to trust the machine or not. Game theory provides a formal 
model for carrying out this reasoning, and has shown that the following mechanisms can 
support trust relationships: 
● Repeated interactions (direct experience / personal experience): long-term 
relationship between the same entities, where actions can be conditioned on past 
behavior, can lead to reciprocal cooperation as proven by the Folk Theorem of game 
theory [20].  This means that an AI system needs to be able to take account of past 
experience. 
● Reputation: Information about how an artificial system has acted towards other people 
in the past can be used to decide whether to trust that system or not [21]. AI can be 
rated by users, and this rating needs to be transparent. But this raises the question of 
which reputation system/norm should be used, i.e. what counts as trustworthy and 
untrustworthy actions by the system, and how is reputation updated after each 
interaction? And when can we trust reputation given that this might be faked, e.g. 
reviews of a system by fake users? 
● Partner choice: A marketplace of potential partners encourages those partners to act 
in a trustworthy way so that other individuals will partner with them in future [22].   In 
the context of AI, this means that rival AI systems from different producers should be 
encouraged. 
● Apology/forgiveness: In the context of human-AI interaction, errors are unavoidable. 
An AI system can apologize when such errors occur in order to build a long-term 
relationship with humans [23]. Theory shows that the apology needs to be delivered in 
a sincere way to be effective, such that it is costly to the producer of the system in 
material / financial terms [24]. 
● Emotions: Evidence from human-computer interaction studies [25] shows that 
AI/robots can be trusted more when they are capable of emotional expressions, e.g. 
feeling guilty when making a mistake. A recent game theory model of guilt shows that 
internalized norms, such as self-punishment when feeling guilty, can promote 
cooperation in a population of self-interested agents [26]. In the context of human-AI 
interaction, AI systems can express their guilt emotion when making an error, for 
instance by providing a sincere, costly apology or doing self-harm if an apology is not 
feasible, in order to maintain trust from humans. However, at least for the present, any 
appearance of emotion necessarily involves deceiving users.  
 
 
Future work needs to investigate the extent to which results from behavioral economics 
experiments on person-person interactions can be transferred to machine-person interactions. 
A key question is how can we prevent mechanisms such as emotions and apologies from 
being used to deceive users. The development of appropriate ethical rules is needed for this.  
Operationalizing moral trust through ethics 
Moral trust involves shared values and norms of behavior [27]. This might imply the machine’s 
decision making is based on its own ‘moral code’. Alternatively, moral trust could also be 
established transitively with machines, through moral trust in the designer of the machines. As 
in human-human relationships, the presence of transparent and trustworthy professional 
ethics is critically important for the trustworthiness of technological systems [28] produced and 
maintained by these people (e.g. the Hippocratic oath of doctors). This could be 
operationalized through a set of codified professional ethics for AI that people cannot opt out 
from using, and inevitably trust [29]. This set of rules must include basic grounding regulations:   
  
● A machine must always identify itself as a machine when initiating a conversation or 
when challenged to do so, to avoid deceiving users into thinking that the machine is 
human. There is a risk that this could happen accidently now that we have new realistic 
speech production technology such as Google Duplex [30]. 
● Individuals and organizations with legal responsibility for the machine must be 
identified. 
● When providing explanations or justifications of actions a machine must neither 
deliberately provide false statements nor deliberately withhold relevant information in 
order to deceive the entity that requested the information. 
● Any decision made by an intelligent machine must be repeatable at a later stage. 
Consequently, program code and data, including context data and metadata delivering 
information such as origin and ownership, must be archived. When applying stochastic 
methods pseudo-random number generators must be initialized with known values and 
these values have also to be archived. 
  
Considering the items in the list above it can be concluded that legal means must be applied, 
although we note that this itself rests on trust in the institutions of the legal system. Developers 
must commit to include appropriate announcements in automated conversations and printed 
statements in written outputs. AI developers must ensure that the mechanisms used are 
inherently “honest”. Note that software systems have been subverted in the past, as in the 
“Diesel gate” scandal [31]. The challenges of ensuring the proper collection of both code and 
data admittedly requires considerable technical expertise and effort. However, it may be 
argued that the scientific community should have overcome such difficulties in the past with 
the need to ensure that published scientific work is both repeatable and verifiable. 
  
Concluding, programmers and providers of intelligent machines have to provide the principal 
benevolence of their systems and a degree of transparency that ensures that the working 
mechanisms of the system can be retraced whenever necessary. We note that the direct 
transparency of professional ethics may require expert knowledge; however those who lack 
this can derive the trustworthiness by relying on expert checkers (auditors) and in turn on the 
easier to understand professional ethics of the auditors. 
 
 
 
Artificial social constructivism and the prospect of 
shared morals between humans and intelligent 
machines 
Can moral trust be established directly with a machine itself, rather than transitively through 
its designer? We advocate applying sociological [32] and psychological [33] principles to 
socio-technical systems, for the reason that it allows the computational or digital agents better 
interpretation of human behavior. This better understanding by digital counterparts in 
interactions may lead to longer lasting relationships between agents in the system, facilitating 
the mechanisms for social trust discussed above. But moreover, it opens the possibility for 
moral trust in the machine itself. Artificial social constructivism is one method by which human 
values, and by extension morals, can be upheld in a socio-technical system consisting of both 
humans, and digital or computational agents. Based on Berger and Luckmann’s seminal 
sociological treatise [34], this theory adapts the same principles of social constructivism from 
a society of purely humans to a mixed society of humans and computers. Humans create their 
own reality through specific uses and definitions of words and repeated interactions to create 
a social reality of norms over time, which are then used to inform and define future behavior.  
 
According to artificial social constructivism, values can be established through first 
establishing and educating agents about system norms. The norms, which are established 
over time, are passed on to both existing and new agents in the system through education. 
The method of education can vary, from following a leader, to general observation and learning 
from previous interactions [35]. The idea is that, similar to the way a child brought up in a 
certain system of behavior begins to view the system’s successes and failures as its own [36], 
through learning, maintaining and enforcing the norms of the system, the agents become 
invested in keeping it going and thus more motivated to uphold it as a whole. Thus, the agents 
establish generalized norms which the whole system will adhere to. The integration of the 
norms and values in this way upholds the key principles of value-sensitive design [37] and 
allows the system the potential to develop and maintain the norms, values and morals that are 
upheld in human society. 
 
Once established, moral trust allows the trust decision to be cut short. Social trust is 
computationally the most expensive form of trust as it requires evaluating the expected gain 
from different possible actions that are available to agents in a trust-requiring situation. But if 
we can assume that the other entities are all following the same norms or moral rules, then 
this acts as a shortcut that avoids us having to carry out this calculation. This is analogous to 
the way that inductive trust can be viewed as an instrument that saves the evaluation efforts 
for a given situation by assuming that it will produce the same outcome as in previous 
occurrences.     
     
Binmore similarly argues that moral trust in human societies is an efficient shortcut for social 
trust [38]. He expresses that as “Ethics arose from nature’s attempt to solve certain 
equilibrium-selection problems”. Apparently, evolutionary processes have favored certain 
successful behavioral patterns and implanted these into the gene pool of populations, or are 
passed on to following generations by social learning. Figure 2 summarizes the differences 
between social and moral trust. 
 
 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
In this paper, we have considered the nature of trust with respect to intelligent technology. 
In particular, we distinguished between three 'levels' of trust: firstly, what we called inductive 
trust, which is based on a mechanistic, perhaps statistical model of expected operation; 
secondly, social trust, which is required to provide predictive leverage and to coordinate 
expectations among agents that have their own goals; and thirdly, moral  
trust, where the intelligent machine is expected to have a comparable understanding for 
qualitative human values, such as morality, justice and rights. 
 
However, the significant contribution of this article is to suggest that we have reached what 
might be conceptualized as an 'ethical crossroads'. There is an essential difference between 
non-intelligent and intelligent technology, and this is that use of intelligent technology 
is bi-directional, that is, as the user utilizes the technology, so the technology can influence  
its user. However, unlike with other media-technology with potential bi-directional properties 
(e.g. the same concerns were expressed for radio, and television), the actual intentions of the 
programmer may be less clearly perceived (or more easily hidden) in interactions with 
intelligent machines than in, say, watching television. It is therefore imperative that the notions 
of social and particularly moral trust are used for pro-social benefits, and not an illusory front 
for more insidious motives.  
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Figure captions 
Figure 1: A network of trust is established among trusting entities towards an unknown but 
trusted entity. The thickness of the arrow indicates the amount of trust. Solid arrows 
represent direct trust relationships, while dotted arrows represent indirect trust relationships. 
Here A trusts T directly. Since B trusts A, it also trusts T in a transitive manner. However, the 
amount of trust is reduced as a result of its indirectness. In a similar way, C, D, and E trust T 
because B trusts A and A trusts T. 
 
Figure 2: Trust relationships can be positioned along a range bounded by two extreme 
cases. On one side, moral trust is underlied by internalized mechanisms e.g. biological 
instincts, internalized norms. The cost to modify or update such mechanism is high. As a 
result, moral trust is slow to modify but more stable. On the other side, social trust is 
underlied by externalized mechanisms e.g. rules. Therefore, these mechanisms are easy to 
modify although at the cost of low stability. The usefulness of moral trust and social trust 
depends on the context with moral trust being more adapted to stable environments and 
social trust being more adapted to dynamic environments. 
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